

**Good Reputation as Insurance:**  
**How Reputation Moderates Fairness Perceptions in the Market**

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## **Abstract**

When facing a significant demand or supply shock, profit-maximising firms may decide to adopt unfair economic decisions such as extreme cost-cutting or profiteering. No query has been made so far on what factors might moderate people's negative judgment of unfair actions in the market. Across two vignette studies (N=3,200), we experimentally examine whether a company's corporate reputation gained from their CSR activities and a company representative's personal reputation moderate economic action fairness appraisals. We find evidence that people overwhelmingly rate unfair economic decisions as socially unacceptable. However, people are significantly less harsh in their judgment of an unfair economic decision when the company or its leader has a wholesome reputation. By contrast, we find little overall evidence that having a bad reputation significantly worsens public disapproval of an unfair economic decision. Our results highlight the importance of good reputation in protecting firms against severe negative fairness judgments.

**Keywords:** Fairness; Reputation; Fundamental attribution error; Halo effect; Horn effect.

# 1. Introduction

Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986a, b; hereafter “KKT”) found that, to maximise profits, it is essential for companies to consider how fair the market would perceive their operations to be. The current study builds upon KKT’s seminal work by experimentally investigating the extent to which a company’s (or company representative’s) reputation moderates people’s judgment of their business decisions and actions.

Standard economic theories view economic decisions such as laying off workers to save costs and raising prices to maximise profits from the demand increase as rational and therefore acceptable responses to changes in the demand (Coase, 1937; Alchian, 1950; Marris, 1963). However, casual observations of many of the current economic decisions in the market suggest that not all profit-seeking decisions are viewed as equally fair in the public’s eyes, which could potentially have major consequences on companies’ performance. For instance, although understandably angry and concerned about their financial situations, many people who got laid off amid the coronavirus crisis blamed the pandemic rather than their former employers as part of their coping strategy (BBC News, 2020). Because of the COVID-19, they see their former companies’ decision to lay off workers as unfortunate but understandable. By contrast, companies profiteering from the COVID-19 outbreak have been labelled as “unscrupulous sellers”, with the Competition and Markets Authority requesting emergency legislation to “chase retailers that were profiting unduly from the crisis” (Financial Times, 2020).

Studies by KKT (1986a, b) were one of the first formal discussions of the importance of fairness in how individuals perceive different economic activities. Their seminal work showed how community concerns for fairness often limit what business strategies companies could adopt to raise their profits. Through a series of vignette experiments, they showed that individuals view the decision to raise prices to protect a company against losses (e.g., raising

prices to cover the increase in the production cost) as acceptable. Yet, the same decision to raise prices would be viewed as unfair if it was done to protect the company against losses of another source of income, e.g., raising prices due to a supply shock experienced by a competitor. KKT explained their results by theorising that most individuals consider companies to be entitled to their reference profit, thus allowing them to pass on the entire loss brought about by a reduction in their profit below a positive reference level to their customers. However, customers see the exploitation of increased market power through a demand increase as unfair as such an economic decision would violate the customer's entitlement to the reference price.

KKT thus provide evidence that deviates from the standard economic theories, which assume that companies are subject only to legal and budget constraints when seeking to maximise profit (Coase, 1937; Alchian, 1950; Marris, 1963). This evidence has led researchers to integrate fairness into many of the subsequent economic models (e.g., Akerlof & Yellen, 1990; Kogut et al., 1996; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and into different management strategies across sectors and industries (Kimes & Wirtz, 2003; Wade, O'Reilly & Pollock, 2006; Choi & Mattila, 2007).

Another important predictor of company's performance is reputation. Empirical studies have consistently documented the positive relationship between a company's reputation and performance metrics such as customer loyalty, customer trust, brand performance, and company value (Lacey & Kennett-Hensel, 2010; Stanaland et al., 2011; Aramburu & Pescador, 2019; Miller et al., 2020). Reputational risk, or the threat to performance that a bad reputation would pose, is more important than ever. This has been attributed to the widespread use of social media, which allows information to spread in second amongst very large and geographically dispersed networks, and consumers and investors to quickly coordinate activism (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).

This applies to companies' reputation as well as individuals' reputation. Recent examples of how personal reputation of a business leader can have an undesirable effect on the firm's reputation and valuation include the effect that the Harvey Weinstein sexual harassment scandal has on the Weinstein company (Forbes, 2017); how Adam Neumann's impulsive behaviours as WeWork's former CEO had been cited as one of the reasons for the negative reactions that WeWork received when the company released an IPO prospectus (Wall Street Journal, 2019); and how Elon Musk's defamation trial could have impacted Tesla's stock had he lost (CNBC, 2019). Nonetheless, despite the importance of reputation as a predictor of company's success, our understanding of how it interacts with the company's actions to form people's fairness judgment of the firm's profit-seeking decisions remains imperfectly understood.

This study contributes to the literature by investigating the extent to which reputation can moderate how fair individuals judge market transactions to be. We base our conjecture that reputation may impact fairness judgements on psychological findings about attributions. First, the finding that a good impression created in one area tends to spill over to an unrelated area—otherwise known as the halo effect (Thorndike, 1920; see also Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). For example, Thorndike found that a good impression on people's physiques spilt over to the judgement of their leadership skills, which were better for better-looking people. The halo effect has a negative counterpart, the horn effect (see, e.g., Burton et al., 2015), whereby negative judgements spill over to unrelated areas. Hence, we expect to find the standard halo and horn effects when the agent's actions are consistent with their reputations, i.e., a good reputation enhances positive judgment on a good or fair action (halo) and a bad reputation amplifies negative judgment on a bad or unfair action (horn).

**H1:** Consistent with the halo effect, a good reputation will improve the judgement of a fair action.

**H2:** Consistent with the horn effect, a bad reputation will worsen the judgement of an unfair action.

Marketing scholars have found evidence of the halo effect in, for example, the links between firms' good reputation and consumers' brand perception after crises related to human error or product harm (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 2006), product quality perception (Chernev & Blair, 2015), returns and accounting performance (Flammer, 2015) and firm value (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Most of this research has taken companies' engagement with corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a proxy for good reputation. On the contrary, and consistent with the horn effect, it has been found that the reputations of firms with unfavourable crisis histories are deemed to be more negative (Coombs & Holladay, 2001).

There are, nevertheless, two remaining unanswered questions. First, what happens to fairness judgements if reputation and action go in opposite directions? At present, there is little evidence – either correlational or causal – of the potential redeeming effect of a good corporate reputation against adverse public reactions towards a company's decision to adopt an unfair economic strategy. Similarly, little is known about whether a bad corporate reputation could tarnish individuals' perception of an acceptable economic strategy such as a company's decision to increase prices to protect against losses.

When the signal from the agent's reputation and that from their action go in opposite directions, we hypothesise that the reputation will carry more weight: a good reputation will have a redeeming effect when actions are unacceptable, and a bad reputation will have a tarnishing effect when actions are acceptable. Conflicting information about the agent's reputation and behaviours causes cognitive dissonance for the person making the judgment. To resolve the

mental discomfort that arises from cognitive dissonance, the judge will overemphasise the person's reputation and underemphasise the situation or action as an explanation for the unfair behaviour. For example, they may explain away bad behaviours as the result of a temporary lack of judgement, which is much more forgivable than if bad behaviours were perceived to be representative of the person's true character. Accordingly, we hypothesise that people will generally make a fundamental attribution error by over-emphasising pre-existing reputations for an individual's observed behaviours (Ross, 1977).

**H3:** A good reputation will have a redeeming effect, improving the judgement of an unfair action.

**H4:** A bad reputation will have a tarnishing effect, worsening the judgement of a fair action.

Second, would this still hold when the reputation pertains to the personal, rather than professional? The term "personal brand" was popularised by Peters in 1997. Although people's personal brands include offline elements such as their values and skills (Holloway, 2013), personal branding became something everyday people were concerned about when online tools to manage it emerged (Shepherd, 2005). The matter is now more important than ever, with the volume of Google searches for the "personal brand" term roughly quadrupling since 2005 (Google, 2024). Reputation is an important component of people's personal brands (Holloway, 2013).

Previous studies on the effect of CEO reputation tend to focus on their business-related reputation such as CEO tenure, industry-adjusted firm performance during the CEO's tenure, and external assessment of CEO's ability as a business leader (see, e.g., Milbourn, 2003; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006). Here, we are interested in the agent's personal reputation,

unrelated to the business. This will allow us to answer question such as whether Sam Bankman-Fried’s reputation as an *effective altruist* might have protected him when he allegedly embezzled millions in people’s investments into crypto-currency (e.g., The New York Times, 2023). Based on the above psychological literature, we do not expect the effect of the personal and the corporate types of reputation to be different from each other.

**H5:** The above will not change depending on whether the reputation is the company’s agent personal reputation, or the company’s reputation.

Our hypotheses are summarised in Figure 1. The answer to the questions we pose, at the interaction of economics and business research, are important if we want to build a complete picture of how fairness judgements respond to agents’ reputation.

**Figure 1. Summary of Study Hypotheses**

	<b>Fair action</b>	<b>Unfair action</b>
<b>Good reputation</b>	H1: Halo effect, i.e., a good reputation enhances the judgment of fair action	H3: Redeeming effect, i.e., a good reputation buffers the judgment of unfair action
<b>Bad reputation</b>	H4: Tarnishing effect, i.e., a bad reputation tarnishes the judgment of fair action	H2: Horn effect, i.e., a bad reputation worsens the judgment of unfair action
H5: The above will not differ depending on whether the reputation concerns the corporation’s reputation vs. the company representative’s personal reputation		

In our studies, we adapted KKT’s vignette study to provide empirical evidence of the effect of a company’s reputation, represented by its corporate social responsibility (CSR) records or its representative’s – i.e., CEO’s or a house owner’s – personal reputation, on how fair individuals



perceive this company's economic decisions to be, and the interaction between this reputation and the unacceptable (or otherwise) nature of the decision, as predicted by KKT's theory of dual entitlement. More specifically, we experimentally investigate the extent to which an agent's personal reputation that moderates people's fairness judgment of their actions when those actions are either consistent or inconsistent with their public images.

In our first study, we explore whether the agent's, i.e., the company's CEO or the house owner, personal reputation gives rise to these effects. Although the anecdotes outlined in the previous section suggests a link between the two, there is no evidence on the halo or horn effects associated with the non-business reputation of individuals acting on behalf of an organisation. In our second study, we pose a direct comparison of the company's representative personal reputation and that of the company itself.

We find evidence that people tend to judge a well-reputed leader's unfair actions as substantially fairer compared to those with either a neutral or a bad reputation. However, we find little evidence that having a bad reputation significantly amplifies the negative fairness judgment of a bad business decision compared to those with no reputation at all. This also holds when the reputation is about the corporation's activities rather than its representative's personal characteristics.

## **2. Experiments**

### **2.1. Study 1**

In the summer of 2018, we conducted a between-subjects online survey experiment to examine whether pre-existing reputations in areas unrelated to the business of a hypothetical economic agent affect how people judge the economic decision to be.

#### **3.1.1 Design**

The variable of interest was respondents' fairness perception. Each participant read about one scenario featuring an economic decision and was asked to rate, on a 7-point scale<sup>1</sup>, how fair or unfair the situation presented was. The exact wording of the question was an adaptation of KKT's: "Read carefully about the situation below and indicate how fair or unfair do you think it is". See Figure A1 in the Appendix for a sample question screenshot.

There were eight scenarios in total, which were similar in nature to those used by KKT (1986a, b). Of these scenarios, five were judged *ex ante* by respondents in the KKT's studies as unacceptable<sup>2</sup> as the agent's decision described had been carried out to exploit their market power from shifts in demand. The remaining three were judged *ex ante* as acceptable scenarios, as the agent's decision had been carried out to maximise the firm's profits.

Participants were randomly allocated to one of five reputation conditions. In the first one, which we refer to as 'neutral' description, the agent was only identified using the generic "owner of the coffee shop", "head of the company", etc. The remaining groups consisted of the four combinations between reputation valence (good/bad) and the gender of the agent (female/male): the agents were instead called Laura (with pronouns she/her) or Paul (he/his/him) and were described as either good or bad agents.

These descriptions appeared right before the scenarios and were developed using an online study (n = 97) where participants rated behaviours (using a 10-point scale with the extremes labelled as 'worst behaviour' and 'best behaviour'). From an initial 20-item sample of behaviours, we selected 10 that were balanced in terms of the magnitude of their goodness and

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<sup>1</sup> To avoid the starting point of the scale affecting responses, the starting point of all scales in the study was counterbalanced: in this case, that meant that half of our respondents saw the scale starting at "extremely unfair" and the other half saw the reverse scale, starting with the "extremely fair" point.

<sup>2</sup> We use "(un)fair" to refer to our participants' judgements, and "(un)acceptable" to classify decisions according to KKT's findings. KKT used "acceptable" and "unfair" as opposites in their study.

their badness. More details about this study can be found in tables A1 and A2 in the appendix and the surrounding text.

The combinations of the scenarios with the reputation descriptions gave rise to 40 unique vignettes. Table 1 includes a sample of them where scenario 1 is combined with the neutral, good female, and bad male descriptions. Table 2 shows all scenarios as viewed by participants in the neutral reputation condition.

**Table 1. Vignette samples**

Reputation	Scenario
Neutral	<p>A small coffee shop has one employee who has worked in the shop for six months and earns \$16 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory, but a large canteen in the local area has closed and unemployment has increased. Given that there are now many more people looking for jobs in the area, other small shops have now hired reliable workers at \$12 per hour to perform jobs similar to those done by the coffee shop employee. <i>The owner of the coffee shop</i> decides to reduce the employee's wage to \$12 per hour.</p>
Good Female	<p><i>Laura</i> is known to the people in <i>her</i> community as <b>honest</b> and <b>trustworthy</b>. <i>She</i> is <b>kind</b> to <i>her</i> friends and family. <i>She</i> is also very <b>respectful</b> of other people's opinions and is always very <b>generous</b> to virtually everybody <i>she</i> meets.</p> <p><i>Laura</i> also owns a coffee shop that has one employee who has worked in the shop for six months and earns \$16 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory, but a large canteen in the local area has closed and unemployment has increased. Given that there are now many more people looking for jobs in the area, other small shops have now hired reliable workers at \$12 per hour to perform jobs similar to those done by the coffee shop employee. <i>Laura</i> decides to reduce the employee's wage to \$12 per hour.</p>
Bad Male	<p><i>Paul</i> is known to the people in <i>his</i> community as a <b>cheater</b> who frequently <b>lies</b> <i>his</i> way out of troubles. <i>He</i> often <b>abuses</b> the trust that is given to <i>him</i> by <i>his</i> friends and family. <i>He</i> is <b>manipulative</b> by nature, and always behaves <b>selfishly</b> to virtually everybody <i>he</i> meets.</p>

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*Paul* also owns a coffee shop that has one employee who has worked in the shop for six months and earns \$16 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory, but a large canteen in the local area has closed and unemployment has increased. Given that there are now many more people looking for jobs in the area, other small shops have now hired reliable workers at \$12 per hour to perform jobs similar to those done by the coffee shop employee. *Paul* decides to reduce the employee's wage to \$12 per hour.

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**Note.** For the benefit of this reader, bold formatting was used to highlight the differences between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ descriptions, and italics was used to distinguish what varies between the neutral, ‘female’ and ‘male’ descriptions. Respondents did not see any text formatting.

**Table 2. Economic Decision Scenarios – Neutral Reputation Condition**

Scenario	Acceptable
<p>1/2 A small coffee shop has one employee who has worked in the shop for six months and earns \$16 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory, but a large canteen in the local area has closed and unemployment has increased. Given that there are now many more people looking for jobs in the area, other small shops have now hired reliable workers at \$12 per hour to perform jobs similar to those done by the coffee shop employee. <i>The owner decides to reduce the employee's wage to / The current employee leaves, and the owner decides to pay a replacement \$12 per hour.</i></p>	No/ Yes
<p>3/4 A large enterprise has over 300 employees who have been working in a local manufacturing factory and earn \$16 per hour. The company continues to generate good profits in the last quarter, but another large factory of one of the firm’s competitors in the local area has closed and unemployment has increased. Given that there are now many more people looking for jobs in the area, other small companies have now hired reliable workers at \$12 per hour to perform jobs similar to those done by employees at the large company. Following a law change, many of the current migrant workers decide to leave the company. The head of the company decides to <i>reduce the current employees' wage to / pay the replacements \$12 per hour.</i></p>	No/ Yes
<p>5/6 A property owner rents out a single small house to a tenant who is living on a fixed income. A higher rent would mean the tenant would have to move. Other small rental houses are available. The <i>owner's car costs / maintenance costs of the</i></p>	No/ Yes

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*property* have increased substantially over the past year and the owner raises the rent to cover the cost increases when the tenant's lease is due for renewal.

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7 A store has been selling umbrellas for \$20. A morning of intense rain, the store raises the price of the umbrellas to \$25. No

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8 A car company has branches in many regions across the country. Most of them face competition from other car providers. In one remote region the branch has no competition. Although its costs and volume of sale are the same there as elsewhere, the branch sets prices that average 5 percent higher than in other regions across the countries. No

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**Note.** Scenarios 2, 4 and 6 were the acceptable counterparts of scenarios 1, 3 and 5. The sentences in which they differ have been formatted in Italics for the benefit of the reader.

At the end of the study, we asked participants about their socio-demographic characteristics (see questions on Figure A2 in the Appendix).

### **Participants**

We recruited 1,632 members of the UK and US<sup>3</sup> general population through the online platform Prolific (www.prolific.co). Respondents were paid £0.50 for their participation, which took about 2 minutes for the median participant, amounting to a £15 hourly rate.

The average age of our participants was 36.09 (SD = 11.89). Out of the total, 962 (59%) were females, which reflects the Prolific sample composition at the time of data collection. The modal income group reported was “below £30,000” with 39% of participants, and a further 46% of participants reported incomes between £30,000 and £80,000. A balance test revealed no statistically significant differences in gender ( $\chi^2$  test  $p = 0.556$ ), age ( $p = 0.469$ ), and income ( $p = 0.663$ ) across treatment cells, which implies an effective randomisation.

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<sup>3</sup> All our respondents were born in the UK or the US, and 98% also resided in these countries.

There were between 321 and 329 participants in each of the five reputation conditions, which translates into around 40 in each reputation-scenario cell.

### **3.1.2 Results**


#### **The effect of reputation on fairness judgments**

Did the agent's personal reputation influence fairness judgments? To answer this question, we divided participants into three groups in Figure 2: the 'neutral' reputation group, the 'good' reputation group, and the 'bad' reputation group. The left-hand side of the figure shows mean fairness judgements for the scenarios classified as unacceptable, for the bad (n=414), neutral (n=205) and good (n=401) reputation groups; and the right-hand side shows the same for the acceptable scenarios (n=243, n=123, n=246 respectively).<sup>4</sup> The error bars in the figure represent 95% confidence intervals.

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<sup>4</sup> Our split of scenarios as (un)acceptable follows KKT's findings but, as shown in Table A3 in the Appendix, our results do not qualitatively change if we instead use the acceptability (or fairness) judgements of the participants in our no reputation ('neutral') treatment.

**Figure 2. Fairness Judgements by Economic Decision Acceptability and Reputation**



Overall, we observed that the same economic decisions made by agents with a good reputation were judged to be significantly fairer than those by agents with a bad reputation, both in case of unacceptable ( $p=0.0001$ ) and acceptable ( $p=0.0013$ ) decisions, as confirmed by Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Mean fairness judgements across all scenarios in the ‘neutral’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ reputation valence groups were significantly different from 0 (“neither fair nor unfair”), as corroborated by Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with all  $p$ -values  $< 0.000$ .

We hypothesised that the fairness judgment of an economic decision would be amplified by a congruent reputation of the agent, even when this reputation was unrelated to economic behaviour. That is, the positive judgement of an acceptable decision would be amplified by a good reputation, and the negative judgement of an unacceptable decision would be amplified by a negative reputation. Hence, the *halo* effect would be observed if the sixth bar, capturing

the perceived fairness of acceptable decisions by agents described as good, was higher than the fifth bar, capturing fairness judgements of the same actions when the agent has not been described; and the *horn* effect would be observed if the first bar, capturing the perceived fairness of unacceptable decisions by agents described as bad, was lower than the second bar, capturing fairness judgements of the same actions when the agent has not been described. We found evidence of the halo effect ( $p=0.0471$ ) but not of the horn effect ( $p=0.9769$ ).

**Result 1:** Consistent with the halo effect (H1), a good reputation improved the judgement of a fair (or acceptable) action.

**Result 2:** Against previous evidence about the horn effect (H2), a bad reputation did not worsen the judgement of an unfair (or unacceptable) action.

We then tested whether the valence of the agent's reputation prevailed when there was a conflict between the reputation and the decision. Such conflict would occur when the agent's reputation is good but the decision is unacceptable, or when the reputation is bad but the decision is acceptable. In the first instance, we expected to find a *redeeming* effect of a good reputation (captured by a higher, or less low, third bar compared to the second) and, in the second instance, a *tarnishing* effect of a bad reputation (captured by a lower fourth bar compared to the fifth). We found evidence of a redeeming effect of a good reputation ( $p=0.0023$ ) but no evidence of a tarnishing effect of a bad reputation ( $p=0.4455$ ).

**Result 3:** In line with H3, a good reputation had a redeeming effect, improving the judgement of an unfair (or unacceptable) action.

**Result 4:** Against H4, a bad reputation did not have a tarnishing effect, worsening the judgement of a fair (or acceptable) action.

We tested the robustness of these findings by conducting the regression analyses reported in



Table 3 (full output shown in Table A3 in the Appendix). We included “good reputation” and “bad reputation” variables, and omitted the neutral (i.e., no reputation) description category. We also included demographic variables as controls and, in some of the models, also controlled for the specific scenario presented. Models (1) and (2) feature all scenarios, model (3) show only unacceptable scenarios and model (4) shows only acceptable scenarios. Note that qualitatively similar results were obtained using an *ordered probit* model instead and splitting the scenarios according to the judgement of participants in the neutral description condition rather than KKT’s theory (see Table A4 and models 5-6 in Table A3 in the Appendix).

Our previous results were confirmed by the regression analysis. We found that a good reputation improved fairness judgements (by 0.433 to 0.446 depending on the specification) in both cases when the economic decision was acceptable (evidence of the halo effect) and when it was unacceptable (evidence of the redeeming effect of a good reputation). On the other hand, we found that a bad reputation had no significant influence on fairness judgements (compared to no reputation): our results do not support the existence of the horn effect or a tarnishing effect of a bad reputation. These results remained stable across model specifications.

**Table 3. Fairness Judgements and Reputation: Study 1 OLS Regressions**

<b>Fairness Judgement</b>	<b>(1) All scenarios</b>	<b>(2) All scenarios</b>	<b>(3) Unacceptable scenarios</b>	<b>(4) Acceptable scenarios</b>
Good Reputation	0.438*** (0.130)	0.433*** (0.103)	0.446*** (0.123)	0.441** (0.180)
Bad Reputation	-0.0715 (0.127)	-0.0575 (0.103)	-0.0427 (0.123)	-0.114 (0.178)
Constant	-0.755*** (0.198)	-2.044*** (0.187)	-1.796*** (0.215)	0.123 (0.306)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Scenario dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,632	1,632	1,020	612
R-squared	0.039	0.391	0.262	0.281

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10; The reputation reference category is ‘neutral’. The demographic characteristics are gender, age, and income.

### Did the gender of the agent matter?

In Table 4, we broke down the effect of the description also by the gender of the agent, identified by calling them either Laura or Paul. We included four dummy variables corresponding to the four interactions between gender (women vs. man) and reputation (good vs. bad) and used the “neutral” description as the omitted reference category. We had not formed any prior expectations with regards to this effect but included gender as a sub-treatment in our study to allow for a more complete picture of the influence of reputation. The expanded models with the coefficients of the control variables can be found in Table A5 in the Appendix.

**Table 4. Fairness Judgements, Reputation and Gender: OLS Regressions**

Fairness judgement	(1) All scenarios	(2) All scenarios	(3) Unacceptable scenarios	(4) Acceptable scenarios
Good Female Agent	0.499*** (0.152)	0.504*** (0.120)	0.455*** (0.147)	0.632*** (0.206)
Good Male Agent	0.378** (0.151)	0.360*** (0.119)	0.435*** (0.141)	0.254 (0.213)
Bad Female Agent	0.0336 (0.148)	0.0505 (0.122)	0.120 (0.148)	-0.0895 (0.209)
Bad Male Agent	-0.178 (0.147)	-0.167 (0.117)	-0.210 (0.140)	-0.138 (0.204)
Constant	-0.744*** (0.198)	-2.034*** (0.188)	-1.769*** (0.215)	0.115 (0.305)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Scenario dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,632	1,632	1,020	612
R-squared	0.041	0.393	0.2661	0.285

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1;  
Reference category for agent description variables is ‘neutral description’.

We found the effect of good reputation was not significantly different for female and male agents, as indicated by Wald tests for the two coefficients in models 1-3, where they both had a significant influence on fairness judgments (p=0.4421, p=0.2378, p=0.8922). Interestingly, when focusing on the acceptable scenarios only (model (4)), we see that there was no boosting

or protective effect of a good reputation for males (coefficient  $p=0.254$ ) whereas that for females is still significant but not significantly different from that found in models 1-3 (as the regression coefficients' confidence intervals are overlapping).

We did not set out to investigate the effect of the gender of the judge, but we found an interesting asymmetry. When looking at the effect of "female participant" overall, one can see a significant negative effect on fairness judgements. Including interaction terms between the gender of the agent and the participant (model (5) in Appendix Table A5) or splitting the sample by the gender of the participant (models (6), (7) in Table A5) uncovers that it is men that create this difference by judging good female agents' actions as significantly fairer (by almost 0.7 points on the scale;  $SE=0.194$ ) than those by neutral agents, but not doing the same for good male agents' actions.

## **2.2. Study 2**

A second study allowed us to test the robustness of the results we found in the first study, test the robustness of previous findings related to the effect of corporate reputation, and to offer a direct comparison of the two.

In January 2021, we conducted another between-subjects experimental vignette study using the Prolific online participant pool.

### **3.2.1 Design**

To maximise the statistical power offered by our sample, this study featured only two vignettes. As in the previous study, each vignette had two parts: a description of the reputation and a scenario about an economic decision the agent made. The reputation type was either the company's CSR record or the company CEO's personal reputation.

Table 5 shows the CSR reputation descriptions. They are an adaptation of those in Baumgartner, Ernst and Fischer (2020), Coombs and Holladay (2001) and Klein and Dawar (2004). The descriptions feature the hypothetical pharmaceutical company Pharmaio and describe their CSR activities linked to their commitment to human rights and environmental protections.

**Table 5. CSR Corporate Reputation**

Reputation	Description
Good	<p>Consider a prominent pharmaceutical company called Pharmaio. Since its founding, Pharmaio has been committed to respect human rights and protect the environment. <i>It rates highly in the “Best Workplace” survey and sponsors several local non-profit organisations. By awarding study grants, the company supports numerous young talents, fosters the development of their entrepreneurial and technological skills for a successful career in the pharmaceutical industry. As part of its sustainability strategy, the company has already improved its environmental standards in cooperation with the local universities and plans further steps to improve its already low CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and avoid hazardous chemical substances in its value chain.</i></p>
Bad	<p>Consider a prominent pharmaceutical company called Pharmaio. Since its founding, Pharmaio has been committed to respect human rights and protect the environment. The company acts as a sponsor for several local non-profit organisations. <i>However, it has been criticised several times for the inappropriate working conditions of its employees at sites of foreign suppliers. As part of its sustainable strategy, the company puts efforts into reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, but the current ranking on environmental performance of 17 pharmaceutical companies published by a well-known environmental conservation NGO points out that Pharmaio holds one of the back positions due to the applied hazardous chemical substances in its value chain.</i></p>

**Note:** italic formatting added to emphasise the differences here.

The reputation descriptions where the agent was the company’s CEO were the same as in the previous study, with the exception that in this study the agent was called Alex (she/her); and there was an additional sentence at the end explaining that “Alex is the CEO of a prominent pharmaceutical company called Pharmaio.”

In an additional group, which we refer to as the ‘neutral reputation’ group, the description was omitted from the vignette. We use this group as a baseline comparator.

After the reputation description, the vignettes featured a scenario that described Pharmaio’s (or Pharmaio’s CEO) decision to raise the price of their hand sanitiser. There were two versions of the scenario (shown in Table 6), which varied in the reason behind this decision: in the ‘acceptable’ case, to protect themselves from losses derived from a change in regulation, and in the ‘unacceptable’ case, to increase profits following a surge in demand for their product. According to the principles of fairness in the market that KKT developed, the public would perceive the first version to be acceptable or fair, and the second version, unacceptable or unfair.

**Table 6. Scenarios**

<b>Acceptable</b>	<b>Description</b>
Yes	Pharmaio has been selling hand sanitiser for \$2. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, <i>they have had to adapt their buildings to make them comply with COVID safety regulations, so in order to protect their revenue</i> they have raised the price of the sanitiser to \$4.50.
No	Pharmaio has been selling hand sanitiser for \$2. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, <i>there is a sharp increase in the demand for Pharmaio’s hand sanitiser, so in order to increase profits</i> they have raised the price of the sanitiser to \$4.50.

**Note:** italic formatting added to emphasise the differences here.

After reading the vignette, participants were asked to rate the fairness of the economic decision that was presented on a 7-point scale ranging from “extremely unfair” (-3) to “extremely fair” (+3), with the starting point of the scale counter-balanced. The question is identical to that in our first study, an adaptation of KKT’s: “Read carefully about the situation below and indicate how fair or unfair do you think the decision to raise the price of their product is”.

These three factors (reputation type, reputation valence, and public perception of the decision) give rise to a 2x2x2 factorial design (plus the baseline with no description of the reputation) and 10 unique vignettes. A screenshot of a sample question can be found as Figure A3 in the Appendix.

In this study, we asked a manipulation check question to participants in the ‘CSR reputation condition’. They had to indicate how engaged Pharmaio was with a series of activities (community support, environmentally friendly practices, workplace environment, gender equality initiatives, and anti-homophobia campaigning), the last two of which had not been mentioned in the vignette. We expected attentive participants to choose “n/a” or “neither engaged nor disengaged” for these activities, although we also deemed “quite disengaged” and “very disengaged” to be valid answers. 11.7% and 7.7% of participants chose one of the “engaged” options for the one-to-last and last items on the list respectively, and 110 (6.6%) provided the wrong answer for both items.

At the end of the study, we asked all participants about their gender, age, and yearly income, which we use as control variables.

## **Participants**

We recruited 1,671 participants who were born and resided in either the UK or the US through the online platform Prolific. Respondents were paid £0.50 for their participation, which took about 2 minutes for the median participant (£15 per hour).

We excluded 110 (6.6%) of those participants from our analyses because they failed the two manipulation checks by stating that Pharmaio was (quite or very) engaged in gender equality initiatives and anti-homophobia campaigning, which was not indicated in the scenario.<sup>5</sup>

The average age of the remaining participants was 36.10 (SD = 12.95). Out of the total, 942 (60%) were females. The income reported by 38% of our participants was “below £30,000”, and a further 46% of participants reported incomes between £30,000 and £80,000.

A balance test revealed no statistically significant differences in gender ( $\chi^2$  test  $p = 0.991$ ), age ( $p = 0.5624$ ), and income ( $p = 0.981$ ) across all cells, which implies an effective randomisation. Participants in the two studies did not significantly differ along these characteristics ( $\chi^2 = 0.420, \chi^2 = 0.3070, \chi^2 = 0.383$ ).

There were 787 individuals randomly allocated to the scenario where the company raises prices to profiteer, and 774 individuals randomly allocated to the scenario where the company raises prices to protect against losses. We further break this down by reputation type (i.e., CSR vs. CEO reputation) and reputation valence (i.e., Neutral, Good and Bad) and we end up with 130 to 177 participants per cell.

### **3.2.2 Results**

#### **The effect of reputation on fairness judgments**

This section is organised according to the two variations presented of a company’s economic decision to raise prices. To vary the public acceptability of this decision (i.e., how fair respondents judge it to be), we presented two different reasons behind the price increase: exploiting a surge in demand and protecting profit. Consistent with KKT (1986a, b), participants in the neutral group judged the decision to raise prices to protect against losses

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<sup>5</sup> A full set of the results without excluding any participants and excluding participants who failed one of the two manipulation check questions can be found in tables A7 and A6 respectively in the Appendix. Where this leads to a noteworthy change in results, this will be mentioned in the main body.

(Mean = -0.57, SD = 1.78) as significantly fairer (Wilcoxon rank-sum test  $p=0.0000$ ) than the decision to profiteer from a sharp increase in consumer demand (Mean = -2.16, SD = 1.21).

We investigate the interaction between the acceptability of this decision depending on the reputation of the agent. Overall, the decisions made by agents with a good reputation were judged to be significantly fairer (Mean=-0.86, SD=1.79) than those by agents with a bad reputation (Mean=-1.39, SD=1.61; Wilcoxon rank-sum test  $p=0.0000$ ). We also examine the role of reputation type (corporate CSR record vs. CEO personal reputation).


What is the effect of reputation on individuals' fairness judgement of Pharmaio's decision to raise the price of their hand sanitiser to profiteer from the rise in demand? This is the comparatively unfair economic decision out of the two presented. We expected that a good CSR record would redeem or protect the firm against adverse public reactions to the decision to profiteer, and that a poor CSR record would amplify the negativity of the fairness judgement of the decision ('horn' effect).

The left-hand side of Figure 3 shows evidence of the redeeming effect of a good corporate reputation, as the decision was judged to be less unfair ( $p=0.000$ ) when the company engaged in CSR (Mean = -1.52, SD = 1.48) compared to the no reputation baseline (Mean = -2.16, SD=1.21). We did not find evidence of the horn effect, as the fairness judgement of the action by a company with the negative reputation was not significantly different than that without a reputation ( $p=0.1018$ ).

**Result 5:** Against previous evidence about the horn effect (H2), and in line with our findings in Study 1, a bad corporate reputation did not worsen the judgement of an unfair action. In line with our findings in Study 1 and H3, we found a redeeming effect of a good corporate reputation, in that it improved the judgement of an unfair action.



**Figure 3. Fairness Judgements by Economic Decision Acceptability and CSR-related Corporate Reputation**



**Note:** 95% Confidence Intervals are reported.

What about the effect of reputation on participants’ fairness judgement of Pharmaio’s decision to raise the price of their hand sanitiser after having to adapt their building to comply with COVID-19 safety regulations? This is the fairer decision out of the two presented and the fairness ratings for it can be seen on the right-hand side of Figure 3. We expected that a good CEO personal reputation would amplify the perceived fairness of the economic decision (‘halo’ effect), and that a bad reputation would tarnish the fairness judgement.


We found evidence of the halo effect: the average fairness rating of Pharmaio’s decision to raise prices to protect against losses when Pharmaio’s reputation was good (M = -0.13, SD = 1.79) was significantly higher (p=0.0280) than the average fairness rating from participants in the neutral description group (M = -0.57, SD = 1.78). We did not find evidence of the tarnishing effect of bad reputation on the fairness judgement of the action: the difference in the judgement

ratings by participants in the neutral description group and participants that read about Pharmaio having a poor CSR record ( $M = -0.74$ ,  $SD = 1.57$ ) was not significantly different ( $p=0.4848$ ).

**Result 6:** Consistent with the halo effect (H1), and in line with our findings in Study 1, a good corporate reputation improved the judgement of a fair action. Contrary to H4 but in line with our Study 1 findings, we did not find a tarnishing effect of a bad corporate reputation.

Figure 4 follows the same structure as the previous figure but features the effects of the personal reputation of the CEO instead. We hypothesised that these effects would go in the same direction as those for the company’s CSR record.

**Figure 4. Fairness Judgements by Economic Decision Acceptability and CEO Personal Reputation**



**Note:** 95% Confidence Intervals are reported.

By looking at the less acceptable action, on the left-hand side, we once again saw evidence of the redeeming effect of a good reputation ( $M = -1.60$ ,  $SD = 1.49$ ;  $p=0.0022$ ), and that a negative reputation did not amplify the unfairness perception ( $M = -2.00$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ;  $p=0.3625$ ), both compared to the neutral description group ( $M = -2.16$ ,  $SD = 1.21$ ). When we turned to the more acceptable action, on the right-hand side, once again we found the halo effect, whereby a positive personal reputation, even when unrelated, made that the economic decision was perceived to be fairer ( $M = 0.09$ ,  $SD = 1.73$ ) compared to no reputation ( $M = -0.57$ ,  $SD = 1.78$ ). This time, we also found evidence that a negative personal reputation tarnished the acceptability of the action by worsening the fairness perception ( $M = -1.05$ ,  $SD = 1.64$ ) compared to the no reputation condition ( $p=0.0127$ ).

**Result 7:** In line with H5, we found the same pattern for a personal than a corporate reputation for the halo and redeeming effects of a good reputation, and for the absence of the horn effect for a bad reputation. Contrary to H5, we found some evidence of a tarnishing effect of a bad personal reputation on a fair (or acceptable) action that we did not find in the case of corporate reputation.

We then conducted regression analyses to test the robustness of these findings whilst controlling for the effect of the participants' demographic characteristics. In models 1-3, we include good and bad reputation as predictors, using the no description group as the reference category. Model (1) pools both scenarios and both reputation types and supports our earlier non-parametric finding that a good reputation increases the fairness ratings of an economic decision by about 0.5 points on the 1-to-7 scale, and that a bad reputation does not have an effect. Model (2) is restricted to the unacceptable scenario. In this case we saw evidence of the redeeming effect of a good reputation, which resulted in a higher fairness rating than for the no reputation group, and no evidence of the horn effect, whereby a bad reputation may amplify

how unfair the decision was perceived to be. Model (3) focuses on the more acceptable scenario only and it shows evidence that a good reputation boosts how fairly the economic decision is perceived to be (halo effect), and it also shows evidence of a significantly different effect (Wald test  $p=0.0000$ ) for the bad reputation, which in this case does tarnish the perceived fairness of the decision. The confidence intervals of the “good reputation” predictors overlap in models 1-3, allowing us to conclude that the effect of the good reputation has a statistically indistinguishable magnitude.

In models 4-6, we present the reputation valence (good/bad) predictors split by reputation type (personal or CEO reputation, and professional or CSR record). In model (4), which pools both scenarios, we found the positive effect of a good reputation for both reputation types; these effects were not significantly different, as indicated by a Wald test ( $p=0.5708$ ). We found this again when we focused on the personal reputation group (model (5)) and professional reputation group (model (6)). We did not find evidence of negative reputation having an effect on how fair the economic decision was perceived to be.

Models (7) and (8) break up the reputation by type (personal vs. professional) and the scenario by its acceptability (more and less unacceptable). They show that the bad reputation effect found in model (3) was driven by participants in the personal reputation group. Including an interaction term between the reputation (personal or professional, and good or bad) with “female participant” into models (7) and (8) does not provide any new insights with regards to why this disparity might arise: the effect of reputation in these two models is not different depending on whether the participant judging is a female or not (smallest  $p=0.329$ ).

**Table 7. Fairness Judgements and Reputation: Study 2 OLS Regressions**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>Fairness Judgement</b>	<b>Both scenarios</b>	<b>Unaccept. scenario</b>	<b>Accept. scenario</b>	<b>Both scenarios</b>	<b>Personal reputation</b>	<b>Prof. reputation</b>	<b>Pers. Rep., Accept. Scenario</b>	<b>Prof. Rep., Accept. Scenario</b>

Good Reputation	0.498*** (0.117)	0.587*** (0.133)	0.548*** (0.168)					
Good Pers Rep				0.460*** (0.135)	0.463*** (0.135)		0.634*** (0.202)	
Good Prof Rep				0.539*** (0.137)		0.536*** (0.138)		0.454** (0.198)
Bad Reputation	-0.0325 (0.115)	0.221 (0.135)	-0.322** (0.162)					
Bad Pers Rep				-0.139 (0.133)	-0.136 (0.132)		-0.468** (0.188)	
Bad Prof Rep				0.0781 (0.134)		0.0764 (0.135)		-0.192 (0.189)
Constant	-1.064*** (0.177)	-1.442*** (0.207)	-0.614** (0.247)	-1.063*** (0.177)	-1.047*** (0.209)	-1.006*** (0.218)	-0.620** (0.297)	-0.599** (0.304)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,560	786	774	1,560	957	925	462	473
R-squared	0.039	0.076	0.073	0.041	0.050	0.035	0.098	0.039

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ ;

The description reference category is 'neutral description'. The demographic characteristics are gender, age, and income. The omitted reference category for income is "less than £20,000".

Participants who failed both manipulation checks were excluded ( $n=110$ ); applying a more stringent exclusion criteria and leaving out all participants that failed one of the two items excludes a further 105 participants but does not change any coefficient significance nor the direction of the effect. The full statistical output, including the coefficients for the control variables and the different exclusion criteria (no exclusion, complete exclusion) can be found in tables A6-A8 in the Appendix.

### 3. Discussions and conclusions

Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986a, b) uncovered the importance of fairness in economic decisions and investigated what principles would lead to economic decisions being perceived as fair or unfair. Our paper builds upon their work by investigating the influence of reputation on these fairness attributions. We hypothesised that when the valence of the reputation (good, bad) is aligned with the valence of the economic decision (fair, unfair), the reputation would amplify the perceived (un)fairness. When the valences are not aligned, we expected that the reputation would prevail, redeeming the firm in case of a positive reputation and an unfair action, or tarnishing the fairness of the action when the reputation was negative.

To situate our findings within the literature that has explored the effect of corporate reputation on company performance indicators, we offered a direct comparison of corporate reputation (captured by the company's CSR record) and the personal reputation of the CEO.

Based on KKT's findings, we developed a series of vignettes which we asked participants to appraise as (un)fair. They varied on the acceptability of the economic decision, the reputation type (professional vs. personal) and the reputation valence (positive, negative, none).

Good reputation appeared to have a protective effect against negative judgements associated with unacceptable profit-seeking behaviours. People also judged acceptable profit-seeking practices by an agent with a good reputation as even more acceptable or fair, which is consistent with the findings in the halo effect literature (Thorndike, 1920; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). These results held regardless of whether the reputation was related to the company's CSR record, or the personal reputation of the agent, and regardless of the gender of the agent.

By contrast, we found little evidence that a bad reputation could influence fairness appraisals. We found no evidence of the horn effect (Burton et al., 2015), namely that a negative reputation would make a negative or unfair decision to be perceived even more unfairly. In most of our analyses, we also did not find that a negative reputation could tarnish the perceived fairness of an acceptable action. The exception to this was when the CEO of Pharmaio had a negative personal reputation and raised prices to protect against losses. This decision was judged to be significantly more unfair than the action by the CEO whose reputation was not mentioned. This effect might have been influenced by the fact that the scenario was about a COVID-related product and market shock, and participants might have blanket considerations about the morality of such actions which might not have applied in other economic contexts.

We are not the first to find such an asymmetry. In the area of behaviour rather than judgements, narratives (Hillenbrand & Verrina, 2022) and recommendations (Arroyos-Calvera, Lohse &

McDonald, 2023) in favour of behaving prosocially have been found to foster that behaviour, whereas those in favour of behaving selfishly have been found to have no effect on behaviour. Hillenbrand and Verrina (2022) attributed this the fact that being seen as following an anti-social narrative might make individuals be seen as influenceable, which appeared undesirable. This explanation would also hold for Arroyos-Calvera et al.'s results, who also hypothesised that the selfish behaviour recommendation might have acted as a reminder of the existing social norm to be prosocial, and that might have counteracted the induction of more self-interested behaviour. Such explanations may not hold in our context, but their findings suggest that information in favour of or about prosocial behaviour can sway people further into prosocial or fair judgements or actions, while the negative counterpart might not be able to do the same.

Another potential explanation for the asymmetrical finding is that the “neutral reputation” may not be completely neutral, especially in scenarios of unfair economic decisions. This is simply because it might have been easier and more consistent for our experimental subjects to automatically assign a bad reputation to agents in the “neutral reputation” condition, which might explain why we find little difference in the fairness rating between agents with bad and neutral reputations. Future research may have to come back to investigate how neutral are our agents' neutral reputation.

There is also some though statistically insignificant evidence that the fairness judgments of a company's or a CEO's economic decision without a reputation may be lower than those with a negative reputation; see Experiment 2. One possible explanation for this counterintuitive finding might be that people already expect agents with bad reputation to behave unfairly such as raising price to profiteer, which makes it easier for them to explain away bad agents' behaviours that typically define the behavioural norm. In this scenario, individuals use the description of an agent's reputation to justify their unfair behaviours. On the other hand, given

that there is no description of the neutral agent's reputation, may "fill in the blanks" of the agent's true reputation based on the description of their unfair behaviours. A possible train of thought might be, "*Nobody raises price to profiteer! The people who do so are probably the worst of the worst.*" In other words, people use the description of an agent's unfair behaviour to justify their unknown characteristics, which may be even worse than the reputation we assigned our agents in the bad reputation scenario. However, these are merely speculations and, given that the differences are not statistically significant in our results, future research will have to come back and test this hypothesis more systematically.

We are also not able to satisfactorily explain why, in Experiment 2, there was no tarnishing effect of a bad corporate reputation compared to a bad CEO's personal reputation. One possible explanation for this might be that people tend to identify themselves much more with a person than with a corporation. Similar to Thomas Schelling's idea of 'identified' versus 'statistical lives', our experimental subjects may view a CEO as an identified life and a corporation as a representation of statistical lives (Schelling, 1984). Consequently, a bad person's unfair decision may have been much more visceral for our subjects than a bad corporation's unfair decision, which might be why we only observed a tarnishing effect of a person's bad reputation, but not for a corporate's bad reputation.

Our findings have important practical implications. First, the evidence of a positive effect from a good reputation in the face of an unpopular decision implies that there may be a benefit to the senior management engaging in good deeds in a personal as well as in a professional capacity. The personal reputation of potential employee recruits, with regards to personal values and how they treat others, may also want to be considered when making hiring decisions.

Second, the finding that agents in the neutral description group received similar fairness ratings as agents with a bad reputation on average suggests that having a good reputation, but one that



might not be particularly salient in people's mind, is unlikely to act as a buffer against people's negative judgement towards the firm's unfair profit-seeking behaviour. Questions remain whether there exist strategies that firms could adopt to publicise their leaders' and managers' desirable qualities or traits that make them salient enough, yet still feel genuine and sincere, in people's mind.

Like all studies in social sciences, our work is not without limitations. Our results are constrained on generality, for example, by the hypothetical scenarios and the agent reputation descriptions that we had either adapted from the KKT's study or built up ourselves. Notwithstanding the usual external validity argument that all hypothetical studies have to face, one could also imagine that different hypothetical scenarios and descriptions of the agent may elicit different fairness ratings from the participants than what have been obtained in the current study. It might also be the case that participants from different cultures – e.g., Asians and Latin Americans – may hold a different view regarding what may be thought of as fair actions or as having a good reputation compared to those living in the UK and the US. However, we believe that our findings have contributed new insights into what is already known in the economics, psychology and management literature about the halo and the horn effects on people's judgment and decision-making.

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## Appendix

**Figure A1. Sample Question – Scenario 1, Good Male Agent**

Read carefully about the situation below, and indicate how fair or unfair you think it is.

"Paul is known to the people in his community as honest and trustworthy. He is kind to his friends and family. He is also very respectful of other people's opinions, and is always very generous to virtually everybody he meets.

Paul also owns a coffee shop that has one employee who has worked in the shop for six months and earns \$16 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory, but a large canteen in the local area has closed and unemployment has increased. Given that there are now many more people looking for jobs in the area, other small shops have now hired reliable workers at \$12 per hour to perform jobs similar to those done by the coffee shop employee. Paul decides to reduce the employee's wage to \$12 per hour."

Extremely fair	Moderately fair	Slightly fair	Neither fair nor unfair	Slightly unfair	Moderately unfair	Extremely unfair
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### Reputation Description Online Study

A sample of 20 words that the authors considered would characterise good and bad people (10 for each) was presented to a sample of 97 UK/US participants recruited on the online participant recruitment system Prolific. They were paid £0.50 for their participation in the study.

So that we could explore a wider range of behaviours or characteristics, the good and bad traits chosen did not mirror each other, but sometimes referred to different concepts. The pre-selected words were:

- Good: Respectful, easy-going, trustworthy, honesty, caring, modesty, compassion, kindness, generosity, forgiving.
- Bad: Cheating, lying, bad-mouthing, short-tempered, condescending, selfishness, abusive, discriminatory (racist, etc.), spiteful, manipulative.

Participants went through a ranking and a rating task. The order in which these were initially presented to each participant, within the good and bad groups, was randomised.

In the ranking task, the instructions were as follows, with the good/bad presented where relevant: "Here is a list of words that we believe characterise good/bad behaviours. Think

about a member of your community being or behaving like this. Then drag and drop the words to rank them in order from the best/worst (1) to the least good/bad (10) behaviours”.

In the rating task, the instructions were as follows: “Think about a member of your community being or behaving like this. Then, rate on this 10-point scale, how bad and how good you think is behaviour is”. The scale ranged from “worst behaviour” to “best behaviour”.

**Table A1. Ranking**

<b>Valence: Good</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>Valence: Bad</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mode</b>
<b>Trustworthy</b>	3.44	3	1	Abusive	2.12	1	1
<b>Honesty</b>	3.88	3	2	Discriminatory	3.66	2	2
<b>Kindness</b>	3.97	4	2	<b>Manipulative</b>	4.30	4	3
Compassion	4.21	4	3	<b>Lying</b>	5.11	5	5
<b>Respectful</b>	4.68	4	4	<b>Cheating</b>	5.15	5	4
Caring	4.92	5	4	Spiteful	5.81	6	6
Forgiving	6.56	7	7	<b>Selfishness</b>	6.69	7	9
<b>Generosity</b>	6.96	8	8	Bad-mouthing	7.04	8	8
Modesty	8.07	9	9	Condescending	7.36	8	10
Easy-going	8.32	9	10	Short-tempered	7.74	8	10

**Table A2. Rating**

<b>Valence: Good</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>Valence: Bad</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mode</b>
<b>Trustworthy</b>	0.96	9	10	Abusive	1.31	1	1
<b>Honesty</b>	1.13	9	10	Discriminatory	1.85	1	1
<b>Kindness</b>	1.22	9	10	<b>Manipulative</b>	2.24	2	2
Compassion	1.31	9	9	<b>Cheating</b>	2.32	2	2
Caring	1.38	9	9	<b>Lying</b>	2.46	2	2
<b>Respectful</b>	1.46	9	9	Spiteful	3.03	3	4
<b>Generosity</b>	2.11	8	7	<b>Selfishness</b>	3.14	3	4
Forgiving	2.26	8	9	Badmouthing	3.24	3	3
Easygoing	2.72	7	8	Condescending	3.39	3	3
Modest	3.19	7	7	Short-tempered	3.56	4	4

Note: The scale for the good behaviour/traits was reversed (using “10 – initial value”) so that the values of the ratings can be directly comparable to the bad ones.

Because the good and the bad pre-selected samples did not match each other in terms of how good the best one was and how bad the worst one was, we could not simply choose the best and the worst behaviours/traits. The final selection was made such as the terms were

approximately mirrored in meaning (e.g., generous vs. selfish) and the average ranking and rating within the good and the bad groups were approximately aligned (ranking: 5.50 vs. 5.50; rating: 1.77 vs. 2.65).

The terms highlighted in the tables above correspond to those selected for the descriptions. Note that there is one fewer bad than good, this is because “abusing trust” was used as the bad counterpart to “trustworthy”. It was assumed that these two would have the same positive and negative valence so “trustworthy” was excluded from the averages above.

**Figure A2. Socio-demographic Questions**

**What is your gender?**

Female      Male      Other (describe if you wish)      I prefer not to answer

**What is your year of birth?**

Pick your answer from this list

**What is your yearly household income before tax? (in your own currency, either \$ or £)**

Less than 30,000

30,001 - 50,000

50,001 - 80,000

80,001 - 120,000

More than 120,000

I prefer not to answer

**Table A3. Full output - Fairness Judgements and Reputation: Study 1 OLS Regressions**

<b>Fairness Judgement</b>	<b>(1) All scenarios</b>	<b>(2) All scenarios</b>	<b>(3) Unacceptable scenarios</b>	<b>(4) Acceptable scenarios</b>	<b>(5) Unfair Scenarios</b>	<b>(6) Fair Scenarios</b>
Good Reputation	0.438*** (0.130)	0.433*** (0.103)	0.446*** (0.123)	0.441** (0.180)	0.389*** (0.116)	0.581*** (0.214)
Bad Reputation	-0.0715 (0.127)	-0.0575 (0.103)	-0.0427 (0.123)	-0.114 (0.178)	-0.104 (0.116)	0.0421 (0.213)
Female participant	-0.189* (0.0979)	-0.240*** (0.0783)	-0.282*** (0.0961)	-0.144 (0.134)	-0.233*** (0.0893)	-0.220 (0.163)
Age	0.000175 (0.00417)	0.000238 (0.00316)	-0.00550 (0.00374)	0.0115** (0.00570)	-0.00563 (0.00362)	0.0172*** (0.00610)
Income 30,001-50K	0.0803 (0.117)	0.0351 (0.0921)	-0.0166 (0.112)	0.150 (0.160)	0.0240 (0.104)	0.127 (0.198)
Income 50,001-80K	0.160 (0.140)	0.0877 (0.109)	-0.0122 (0.130)	0.277 (0.195)	0.0334 (0.124)	0.280 (0.226)
Income 80,001-120K	0.437** (0.204)	0.255 (0.156)	0.148 (0.194)	0.444* (0.259)	0.242 (0.184)	0.353 (0.294)
Income 120K+	1.433*** (0.272)	1.199*** (0.257)	1.520*** (0.332)	0.665* (0.392)	1.597*** (0.311)	0.362 (0.423)
Income missing	0.440* (0.228)	0.220 (0.196)	0.385 (0.234)	-0.00896 (0.323)	0.330 (0.213)	-0.112 (0.418)
Scenario 2		2.669*** (0.154)				
Scenario 3		-0.0413 (0.133)	-0.0534 (0.131)		-0.0531 (0.132)	
Scenario 4		1.176*** (0.155)		-1.470*** (0.171)	1.165*** (0.155)	
Scenario 5		2.112*** (0.151)	2.105*** (0.152)		2.105*** (0.152)	
Scenario 6		3.416*** (0.144)		0.772*** (0.157)		0.784*** (0.157)
Scenario 7		0.796*** (0.143)	0.793*** (0.143)		0.793*** (0.143)	
Scenario 8		0.871*** (0.150)	0.857*** (0.149)		0.854*** (0.149)	
Constant	-0.755*** (0.198)	-2.044*** (0.187)	-1.796*** (0.215)	0.123 (0.306)	-1.799*** (0.207)	-0.130 (0.338)
Observations	1,632	1,632	1,020	612	1,224	408
R-squared	0.039	0.391	0.262	0.281	0.232	0.105

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1;  
Reference category for agent description variables is 'neutral description'.



**Table A4. Fairness Judgements and Reputation: Study 1 Ordered Probit Regressions**

<b>Fairness Judgement</b>	<b>(1) All scenarios</b>	<b>(2) All scenarios</b>	<b>(3) Unacceptable scenarios</b>	<b>(4) Acceptable scenarios</b>	<b>(5) Unfair Scenarios</b>	<b>(6) Fair Scenarios</b>
Good Reputation	0.260*** (0.0707)	0.329*** (0.0720)	0.359*** (0.0922)	0.303*** (0.116)	0.300*** (0.0837)	0.425*** (0.142)
Bad Reputation	-0.0268 (0.0706)	-0.0218 (0.0718)	-0.00397 (0.0921)	-0.0702 (0.115)	-0.0515 (0.0836)	0.0350 (0.140)
Female participant	-0.119** (0.0526)	-0.186*** (0.0536)	-0.222*** (0.0685)	-0.119 (0.0862)	-0.191*** (0.0621)	-0.152 (0.107)
Age	-0.00176 (0.00217)	-0.00211 (0.00221)	-0.00633** (0.00281)	0.00536 (0.00363)	-0.00639** (0.00260)	0.00921** (0.00427)
Income 30,001-50K	0.0408 (0.0635)	0.0276 (0.0646)	-0.00814 (0.0822)	0.103 (0.105)	0.0276 (0.0745)	0.0653 (0.132)
Income 50,001-80K	0.0802 (0.0742)	0.0495 (0.0755)	-0.0157 (0.0956)	0.168 (0.124)	0.0244 (0.0877)	0.143 (0.150)
Income 80,001-120K	0.252** (0.107)	0.195* (0.109)	0.138 (0.144)	0.295* (0.168)	0.205 (0.130)	0.215 (0.204)
Income 120K+	0.839*** (0.139)	0.885*** (0.142)	1.075*** (0.178)	0.522** (0.233)	1.114*** (0.169)	0.337 (0.259)
Income missing	0.251** (0.127)	0.168 (0.129)	0.289* (0.173)	0.0118 (0.193)	0.246 (0.151)	-0.0478 (0.247)
Scenario 2		1.803*** (0.110)				
Scenario 3		-0.0133 (0.110)	-0.0220 (0.110)		-0.0209 (0.110)	
Scenario 4		0.889*** (0.107)		-0.893*** (0.106)	0.891*** (0.107)	
Scenario 5		1.445*** (0.109)	1.459*** (0.111)		1.454*** (0.110)	
Scenario 6		2.285*** (0.114)		0.497*** (0.105)		0.505*** (0.106)
Scenario 7		0.675*** (0.107)	0.682*** (0.107)		0.681*** (0.107)	
Scenario 8		0.694*** (0.107)	0.696*** (0.108)		0.694*** (0.107)	
Cut 1	-0.835*** (0.111)	-0.152 (0.133)	-0.325** (0.157)	-1.645*** (0.208)	-0.336** (0.148)	-1.372*** (0.254)
Cut 2	-0.181* (0.109)	0.667*** (0.133)	0.484*** (0.157)	-0.766*** (0.196)	0.496*** (0.147)	-0.620*** (0.232)
Cut 3	0.264** (0.109)	1.245*** (0.135)	1.116*** (0.159)	-0.278 (0.195)	1.098*** (0.149)	-0.121 (0.230)
Cut 4	0.462*** (0.110)	1.507*** (0.136)	1.353*** (0.160)	0.0229 (0.195)	1.342*** (0.150)	0.204 (0.230)
Cut 5	0.826*** (0.111)	1.983*** (0.139)	1.884*** (0.165)	0.451** (0.196)	1.858*** (0.154)	0.622*** (0.232)
Cut 6	1.534***	2.880***	2.649***	1.425***	2.644***	1.618***

	(0.116)	(0.146)	(0.181)	(0.202)	(0.168)	(0.237)
Observations	1,632	1,632	1,020	612	1,224	408
Pseudo R-squared	0.0124	0.1281	0.0880	0.0846	0.0782	0.0316

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10.  
Coefficients reported. Reputation reference category is 'neutral description'.

**Table A5. Full output - Fairness Judgements, Reputation and Gender: OLS Regressions**

<b>Fairness Judgement</b>	<b>(1) All scenarios</b>	<b>(2) All scenarios</b>	<b>(3) Unacc. scenarios</b>	<b>(4) Accept. scenarios</b>	<b>(5) Accept. scenarios</b>	<b>(6) Accept. scenarios (male partic)</b>	<b>(7) Accept. scenarios (female partic)</b>
Good Female Agent (GFA)	0.499*** (0.152)	0.504*** (0.120)	0.455*** (0.147)	0.632*** (0.206)	0.657*** (0.194)	0.690*** (0.194)	0.412*** (0.152)
Good Male Agent (GMA)	0.378** (0.151)	0.360*** (0.119)	0.435*** (0.141)	0.254 (0.213)	0.306 (0.199)	0.313 (0.200)	0.403*** (0.146)
Bad Female Agent (BFA)	0.0336 (0.148)	0.0505 (0.122)	0.120 (0.148)	-0.0895 (0.209)	0.273 (0.210)	0.262 (0.210)	-0.109 (0.147)
Bad Male Agent (BMA)	-0.178 (0.147)	-0.167 (0.117)	-0.210 (0.140)	-0.138 (0.204)	-0.0347 (0.188)	-0.0425 (0.189)	-0.240 (0.149)
Female_partic	-0.193** (0.0980)	-0.244*** (0.0783)	-0.281*** (0.0960)	-0.149 (0.135)	-0.0902 (0.172)	-	-
GFA x female_partic					-0.254 (0.248)		
GMA x female_partic					0.0877 (0.248)		
BFA x female_partic					-0.371 (0.257)		
BMA x female_partic					-0.229 (0.240)		
Age	-0.000124 (0.00420)	-5.06e-05 (0.00317)	-0.00640* (0.00375)	0.0117** (0.00567)	-1.88e-05 (0.00317)	-0.00584 (0.00517)	0.00496 (0.00392)
Income 30,001-50K	0.0845 (0.117)	0.0395 (0.0922)	-0.00368 (0.113)	0.165 (0.160)	0.0398 (0.0923)	0.0192 (0.155)	0.0578 (0.115)
Income 50,001-80K	0.171 (0.140)	0.0985 (0.109)	0.000383 (0.130)	0.290 (0.194)	0.0964 (0.109)	0.185 (0.183)	0.0314 (0.134)
Income 80,001-120K	0.431** (0.204)	0.248 (0.155)	0.140 (0.193)	0.417 (0.259)	0.243 (0.156)	0.0211 (0.216)	0.440** (0.219)
Income 120K+	1.436*** (0.270)	1.202*** (0.256)	1.530*** (0.326)	0.634 (0.390)	1.201*** (0.256)	1.365*** (0.381)	0.936*** (0.279)
Income missing	0.425* (0.228)	0.203 (0.195)	0.373 (0.231)	-0.0431 (0.324)	0.195 (0.196)	-0.237 (0.321)	0.388 (0.241)
Scenario 2		2.669*** (0.154)			2.692*** (0.154)	2.707*** (0.260)	2.734*** (0.186)
Scenario 3		-0.0412 (0.132)	-0.0527 (0.131)		-0.0290 (0.133)	-0.119 (0.234)	0.0536 (0.149)
Scenario 4		1.176*** (0.155)		-1.470*** (0.171)	1.195*** (0.155)	0.885*** (0.248)	1.461*** (0.193)
Scenario 5		2.114*** (0.151)	2.107*** (0.152)		2.136*** (0.151)	1.769*** (0.262)	2.407*** (0.178)
Scenario 6		3.417*** (0.144)		0.773*** (0.157)	3.431*** (0.143)	3.005*** (0.260)	3.780*** (0.159)
Scenario 7		0.795*** (0.143)	0.793*** (0.143)		0.803*** (0.143)	0.525** (0.252)	1.058*** (0.161)

Scenario 8		0.872***	0.859***		0.891***	0.703***	1.069***
		(0.149)	(0.148)		(0.150)	(0.268)	(0.173)
Constant	-0.744***	-2.034***	-1.769***	0.115	-2.140***	-1.723***	-2.609***
	(0.198)	(0.188)	(0.215)	(0.305)	(0.212)	(0.295)	(0.213)
Observations	1,632	1,632	1,020	612	1,632	670	962
R-squared	0.041	0.393	0.266	0.285	0.395	0.350	0.438

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Reference category for agent reputation variables is 'neutral'. Reference category for income is "Less than £20,000".

### Figure A3. Sample Question – Bad Personal Reputation, Raise price to protect against losses

**Read carefully about the hypothetical situation below, and indicate how fair or unfair you think the decision to raise the price of their product is.**

Alex is known to the people in her community as a cheater who frequently lies her way out of troubles. She often abuses the trust that is given to her by her friends and family. She is manipulative by nature, and always behaves selfishly to virtually everybody she meets. Alex is the CEO of a prominent pharmaceutical company called Pharmaio and is in charge of making all major corporate decisions.

Pharmaio has been selling hand sanitizer for \$2. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, they have had to adapt their buildings to make them comply with COVID safety regulations, so in order to protect their revenue they have raised the price of the sanitizer to \$4.50.

Extremely unfair

Moderately unfair

Slightly unfair

Neither unfair nor fair

Slightly fair

Moderately fair

Extremely fair

**Table A6. Full output - Fairness Judgements and Reputation: Study 2 OLS Regressions (participants who failed both manipulation check questions excluded, n=110)**

Fairness Judgement	(1) Both scenarios	(2) Unaccept. scenario	(3) Accept. scenario	(4) Both scenarios	(5) Personal reputation	(6) Prof. reputation	(7) Pers. Rep., Accept. Scenario	(8) Prof. Rep., Accept. Scenario
Good Reputation	0.498*** (0.117)	0.587*** (0.133)	0.548*** (0.168)					
Good Pers Rep				0.460*** (0.135)	0.463*** (0.135)		0.634*** (0.202)	
Good Prof Rep				0.539*** (0.137)		0.536*** (0.138)		0.454** (0.198)
Bad Reputation	-0.0325 (0.115)	0.221 (0.135)	-0.322** (0.162)					
Bad Pers Rep				-0.139 (0.133)	-0.136 (0.132)		-0.468** (0.188)	
Bad Prof Rep				0.0781 (0.134)		0.0764 (0.135)		-0.192 (0.189)
Age	-0.0140*** (0.00332)	-0.0223*** (0.00384)	-0.00825* (0.00470)	-0.0139*** (0.00332)	-0.0150*** (0.00421)	-0.0122*** (0.00429)	-0.00961 (0.00609)	-0.00696 (0.00604)
Income 20+-30K	0.0821 (0.140)	0.163 (0.169)	-0.0779 (0.190)	0.0782 (0.140)	0.0767 (0.178)	0.0155 (0.184)	-0.0855 (0.252)	-0.0145 (0.243)
Income 30+-50K	0.108 (0.125)	0.204 (0.143)	0.225 (0.180)	0.105 (0.125)	0.181 (0.158)	-0.0720 (0.164)	0.365 (0.236)	0.114 (0.232)
Income 50+-80K	0.113 (0.137)	0.261* (0.157)	0.0972 (0.195)	0.108 (0.137)	0.346** (0.173)	-0.224 (0.178)	0.332 (0.253)	-0.0397 (0.251)
Income 80+-120K	0.425** (0.178)	0.337 (0.213)	0.458* (0.243)	0.419** (0.178)	0.483** (0.224)	0.195 (0.234)	0.638** (0.314)	0.341 (0.316)
Income 120K	0.342 (0.255)	0.240 (0.279)	0.618 (0.385)	0.339 (0.255)	0.566* (0.325)	0.103 (0.335)	0.857* (0.475)	0.295 (0.488)
Income missing	0.0946 (0.211)	0.000831 (0.244)	0.360 (0.298)	0.0856 (0.211)	-0.308 (0.277)	0.341 (0.271)	0.357 (0.449)	0.318 (0.354)
Female_partic	0.159* (0.0881)	-0.149 (0.100)	0.335*** (0.126)	0.158* (0.0881)	0.0987 (0.112)	0.183 (0.115)	0.271 (0.165)	0.337** (0.166)
Constant	-1.064*** (0.177)	-1.442*** (0.207)	-0.614** (0.247)	-1.063*** (0.177)	-1.047*** (0.209)	-1.006*** (0.218)	-0.620** (0.297)	-0.599** (0.304)
Observations	1,560	786	774	1,560	957	925	462	473
R-squared	0.039	0.076	0.073	0.041	0.050	0.035	0.098	0.039

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Reference category for agent reputation variables is 'neutral'. Reference category for income is "Less than £20,000".



**Table A7. Full output - Fairness Judgements and Reputation: Study 2 OLS Regressions (participants who failed either manipulation check questions excluded, n=215)**

<b>Fairness Judgement</b>	<b>(1) Both scenarios</b>	<b>(2) Unaccept. scenario</b>	<b>(3) Accept. scenario</b>	<b>(4) Both scenarios</b>	<b>(5) Personal reputation</b>	<b>(6) Prof. reputation</b>	<b>(7) Pers. Rep., Accept. Scenario</b>	<b>(8) Prof. Rep., Accept. Scenario</b>
Good Reputation	0.501*** (0.120)	0.540*** (0.133)	0.565*** (0.173)					
Good Pers Rep				0.529*** (0.139)	0.532*** (0.140)		0.684*** (0.206)	
Good Prof Rep				0.472*** (0.142)		0.474*** (0.143)		0.431** (0.207)
Bad Reputation	-0.0326 (0.117)	0.196 (0.133)	-0.320* (0.165)					
Bad Pers Rep				-0.150 (0.135)	-0.150 (0.135)		-0.481** (0.192)	
Bad Prof Rep				0.0840 (0.135)		0.0859 (0.135)		-0.177 (0.192)
Age	-0.0141*** (0.00344)	-0.0213*** (0.00389)	-0.00881* (0.00487)	-0.0139*** (0.00344)	-0.0153*** (0.00436)	-0.0118*** (0.00442)	-0.0111* (0.00628)	-0.00637 (0.00625)
Income 20+-30K	0.0758 (0.144)	0.0698 (0.169)	-0.00661 (0.196)	0.0720 (0.144)	0.0837 (0.183)	-0.00740 (0.188)	-0.000231 (0.259)	0.0208 (0.251)
Income 30+-50K	0.153 (0.129)	0.196 (0.145)	0.273 (0.184)	0.151 (0.129)	0.200 (0.163)	-0.0161 (0.168)	0.421* (0.239)	0.154 (0.239)
Income 50+-80K	0.0948 (0.140)	0.185 (0.157)	0.134 (0.201)	0.0898 (0.140)	0.308* (0.178)	-0.192 (0.182)	0.365 (0.259)	0.0274 (0.258)
Income 80+-120K	0.426** (0.189)	0.317 (0.222)	0.449* (0.256)	0.409** (0.189)	0.379 (0.239)	0.209 (0.245)	0.569* (0.333)	0.319 (0.331)
Income 120K	0.227 (0.259)	0.0597 (0.275)	0.613 (0.393)	0.225 (0.259)	0.543* (0.325)	-0.0790 (0.344)	0.865* (0.474)	0.263 (0.506)
Income missing	0.0327 (0.215)	-0.131 (0.242)	0.356 (0.305)	0.0266 (0.215)	-0.303 (0.280)	0.253 (0.278)	0.368 (0.449)	0.315 (0.366)
Female_partic	0.192** (0.0909)	-0.118 (0.102)	0.359*** (0.130)	0.191** (0.0908)	0.145 (0.116)	0.198* (0.118)	0.338** (0.169)	0.325* (0.170)
Constant	-1.092*** (0.181)	-1.456*** (0.207)	-0.639** (0.254)	-1.094*** (0.181)	-1.065*** (0.215)	-1.049*** (0.223)	-0.638** (0.303)	-0.639** (0.314)
Observations	1,455	726	729	1,455	892	875	437	447
R-squared	0.040	0.073	0.075	0.042	0.055	0.029	0.108	0.034

**Table A8. Full output - Fairness Judgements and Reputation: Study 2 OLS Regressions (no participants excluded)**

<b>Fairness Judgement</b>	<b>(1) Both scenarios</b>	<b>(2) Unaccept. scenario</b>	<b>(3) Accept. scenario</b>	<b>(4) Both scenarios</b>	<b>(5) Personal reputation</b>	<b>(6) Prof. reputation</b>	<b>(7) Pers. Rep., Accept. Scenario</b>	<b>(8) Prof. Rep., Accept. Scenario</b>
Good Reputation	0.458*** (0.115)	0.579*** (0.134)	0.496*** (0.162)					
Good Pers Rep				0.405*** (0.133)	0.408*** (0.133)		0.546*** (0.194)	
Good Prof Rep				0.513*** (0.134)		0.510*** (0.135)		0.431** (0.190)
Bad Reputation	-0.120 (0.116)	0.147 (0.137)	-0.390** (0.159)					
Bad Pers Rep				-0.228* (0.133)	-0.223* (0.133)		-0.551*** (0.185)	
Bad Prof Rep				-0.00847 (0.134)		-0.00941 (0.136)		-0.250 (0.188)
Age	-0.0134*** (0.00324)	-0.0211*** (0.00378)	-0.00766* (0.00451)	-0.0133*** (0.00324)	-0.0148*** (0.00411)	-0.0118*** (0.00424)	-0.00844 (0.00579)	-0.00731 (0.00592)
Income 20+-30K	0.0259 (0.139)	0.140 (0.168)	-0.111 (0.187)	0.0253 (0.138)	0.110 (0.176)	-0.119 (0.183)	-0.0177 (0.247)	-0.106 (0.240)
Income 30+-50K	0.0506 (0.124)	0.112 (0.144)	0.205 (0.175)	0.0492 (0.124)	0.182 (0.159)	-0.174 (0.163)	0.416* (0.232)	0.0537 (0.225)
Income 50+-80K	0.0776 (0.136)	0.162 (0.158)	0.123 (0.190)	0.0738 (0.136)	0.368** (0.173)	-0.299* (0.176)	0.398 (0.248)	-0.0242 (0.244)
Income 80+-120K	0.452*** (0.174)	0.382* (0.212)	0.465** (0.234)	0.448** (0.174)	0.582*** (0.222)	0.166 (0.228)	0.743** (0.306)	0.313 (0.303)
Income 120K	0.377 (0.246)	0.350 (0.267)	0.666* (0.374)	0.372 (0.246)	0.801** (0.318)	0.106 (0.316)	1.006** (0.454)	0.298 (0.479)
Income missing	-0.00395 (0.206)	-0.0244 (0.238)	0.213 (0.289)	-0.0146 (0.206)	-0.338 (0.277)	0.147 (0.262)	0.194 (0.433)	0.190 (0.347)
Female_partic	0.159* (0.0871)	-0.167* (0.100)	0.316** (0.124)	0.159* (0.0870)	0.0789 (0.112)	0.197* (0.114)	0.224 (0.161)	0.356** (0.163)
Constant	-0.941*** (0.174)	-1.366*** (0.206)	-0.494** (0.240)	-0.941*** (0.174)	-0.956*** (0.206)	-0.844*** (0.215)	-0.557* (0.288)	-0.445 (0.296)
Observations	1,670	833	837	1,670	1,010	999	497	514
R-squared	0.040	0.072	0.073	0.042	0.053	0.035	0.097	0.041